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Message #01837
[Bug 732628] Re: TOCTOU in mount.ecryptfs_private
** Changed in: ecryptfs-utils (Ubuntu)
Status: Fix Released => Confirmed
** Also affects: ecryptfs-utils (Ubuntu Lucid)
Importance: Undecided
Status: New
** Also affects: ecryptfs-utils (Ubuntu Maverick)
Importance: Undecided
Status: New
** Also affects: ecryptfs-utils (Ubuntu Oneiric)
Importance: High
Assignee: Dustin Kirkland (kirkland)
Status: Confirmed
** Also affects: ecryptfs-utils (Ubuntu Natty)
Importance: Undecided
Status: New
** Changed in: ecryptfs-utils (Ubuntu Lucid)
Status: New => Confirmed
** Changed in: ecryptfs-utils (Ubuntu Maverick)
Status: New => Confirmed
** Changed in: ecryptfs-utils (Ubuntu Natty)
Status: New => Confirmed
** Changed in: ecryptfs-utils (Ubuntu Lucid)
Importance: Undecided => High
** Changed in: ecryptfs-utils (Ubuntu Maverick)
Importance: Undecided => High
** Changed in: ecryptfs-utils (Ubuntu Natty)
Importance: Undecided => High
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https://bugs.launchpad.net/bugs/732628
Title:
TOCTOU in mount.ecryptfs_private
Status in eCryptfs - Enterprise Cryptographic Filesystem:
Triaged
Status in “ecryptfs-utils” package in Ubuntu:
Confirmed
Status in “ecryptfs-utils” source package in Lucid:
Confirmed
Status in “ecryptfs-utils” source package in Maverick:
Confirmed
Status in “ecryptfs-utils” source package in Natty:
Confirmed
Status in “ecryptfs-utils” source package in Oneiric:
Confirmed
Status in “ecryptfs-utils” package in Debian:
New
Status in “ecryptfs-utils” package in Fedora:
New
Bug description:
check_ownerships() function doesn't work as it should because of a
race condition. Arguments of both mount() and umount() calls can be
changed between the check and the usage. This may lead to arbitrary
mount point umounting or probably to gaining ability to try
passphrases of otherpeople's ecryptfs storages.
lock_counter() is also racy. It (1) tries to check existance and
ownership of the file before open(), (2) neither use stat() instead of
lstat() nor O_NOFOLLOW, (3) is not protected against deletion of the
lock file by the owner. The lock file should be probably created in
root only writable directory before dropping EUID.
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References