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Message #05761
[Bug 1571691] Re: linux: MokSBState is ignored
** Also affects: linux (Ubuntu Wily)
Importance: Undecided
Status: New
** Also affects: linux (Ubuntu Vivid)
Importance: Undecided
Status: New
** Changed in: linux (Ubuntu Vivid)
Status: New => In Progress
** Changed in: linux (Ubuntu Wily)
Status: New => In Progress
** Also affects: linux (Ubuntu Trusty)
Importance: Undecided
Status: New
** Changed in: linux (Ubuntu Trusty)
Status: New => In Progress
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Matching subscriptions: Ubuntu 16.04 Bugs
https://bugs.launchpad.net/bugs/1571691
Title:
linux: MokSBState is ignored
Status in linux package in Ubuntu:
Fix Released
Status in linux source package in Trusty:
In Progress
Status in linux source package in Vivid:
In Progress
Status in linux source package in Wily:
In Progress
Status in linux source package in Xenial:
Fix Released
Bug description:
Ubuntu-4.4.0-20.36 was released with signed module enforcement
enabled, but contained no way of disabling secure boot for DKMS.
Without these kernel patches it is possible to get your machine in an
unbootable state, especially if you don't have a fallback kernel.
This patch set implements the ability to disable secure boot on demand
from user space (with some password shennaigans). If one boots in
secure boot mode and then installs a third party module (such as
DKMS), then a dialog is displayed giving the user an option to disable
secure boot, thereby also disabling module signature verification.
Patch 1/2 is a scaffold patch of which only the GUID macros are
actually used. The rest of the code is fenced by
CONFIG_MODULE_SIG_UEFI which will not be enabled until a later series.
Patch 2/2 is where MOKSBState is read and implemented. Patch 3/3
simply prints a bit more informative state information.
Information regarding secure boot and signed module enforcement will
appear in the kernel log thusly:
'Secure boot enabled' - normal secure boot operation with signed module enforcement.
'Secure boot MOKSBState disabled' - UEFI Secure boot state has been over-ridden by MOKSBState. No signed module enforcement.
In the absense of a 'Secure boot' string assume that secure boot is
disabled or does not exist.
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References