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[Bug 1298611] Re: [FFe] apparmor signal and ptrace mediation

To: kernel-packages@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx
From: Jamie Strandboge <jamie@xxxxxxxxxx>
Date: Thu, 27 Mar 2014 20:56:12 -0000
Reply-to: Bug 1298611 <1298611@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx>
Sender: bounces@xxxxxxxxxxxxx

** Description changed:

= linux =
This feature freeze exception is requested for signal and ptrace mediation via apparmor in the kernel. When used with a compatible apparmor userspace, signals and ptrace rules are supported. When used without a compatible apparmor userspace (eg, on a precise system with a trusty backport kernel), signal and ptrace mediation is not enforced (ie, you can use this kernel with an old userspace without any issues).

This feature has been tested on a 12.04 system, 14.04 system with
- current apparmor userspace, and 14.04 system with update apparmor
+ current apparmor userspace, and 14.04 system with updated apparmor
userspace capable of supporting signal and ptrace mediation. This
feature has been tested to work on systems using lxc containers.

This feature is required to support comprehensive application
confinement on Ubuntu Touch (a separate pull will be requested at a
later date). This feature adds a significant security benefit to
libvirt's qemu guest isolation which is fundamental to Ubuntu on
- Server/Cloud. This feature adds welcome improvement to administrators
+ Server/Cloud. This feature adds a welcome improvement to administrators
wishing to further protect their systems.

= apparmor userspace =
This feature freeze exception is requested for signal and ptrace mediation for apparmor userspace. When used with a compatible kernel, signals and ptrace rules are supported. When used without a compatible kernel (eg, immediately on Ubuntu Touch or with upstream kernels), signal and ptrace rules are skipped (ie, you can use this userspace with other kernels without issue).

This feature has been tested on a 14.04 system with current kernel and a
14.04 system with updated kernel capable of supporting signal and ptrace
mediation. This feature has been tested to work with on systems using
lxc containers.

This feature is required to support comprehensive application
confinement on Ubuntu Touch. This feature adds a significant security
benefit to libvirt's qemu guest isolation which is fundamental to Ubuntu
on Server/Cloud. This feature adds welcome improvement to administrators
wishing to further protect their systems.

While the apparmor userspace and kernel changes to support signal and
ptrace mediation can happen at different times, the apparmor userspace
upload must correspond with uploads for packages that ship AppArmor
policy that require updates (eg, libvirt, lxc, etc). The packages
outlined in
https://wiki.ubuntu.com/SecurityTeam/KnowledgeBase/AppArmorProfiles will
be tested to either work without modification to the policy or updated
and tested to work with updated policy. Common rules will be added to
the apparmor base abstraction such that most packages shipping apparmor
policy will not require updating. These updates will be prepared, tested
and published en masse via a silo ppa.

** Description changed:

This feature has been tested on a 12.04 system, 14.04 system with
current apparmor userspace, and 14.04 system with updated apparmor
userspace capable of supporting signal and ptrace mediation. This
feature has been tested to work on systems using lxc containers.

This feature is required to support comprehensive application
confinement on Ubuntu Touch (a separate pull will be requested at a
later date). This feature adds a significant security benefit to
libvirt's qemu guest isolation which is fundamental to Ubuntu on
Server/Cloud. This feature adds a welcome improvement to administrators
wishing to further protect their systems.

This feature is required to support comprehensive application
confinement on Ubuntu Touch. This feature adds a significant security
benefit to libvirt's qemu guest isolation which is fundamental to Ubuntu
- on Server/Cloud. This feature adds welcome improvement to administrators
- wishing to further protect their systems.
+ on Server/Cloud. This feature adds a welcome improvement to
+ administrators wishing to further protect their systems.

While the apparmor userspace and kernel changes to support signal and
ptrace mediation can happen at different times, the apparmor userspace
upload must correspond with uploads for packages that ship AppArmor
policy that require updates (eg, libvirt, lxc, etc). The packages
outlined in
- https://wiki.ubuntu.com/SecurityTeam/KnowledgeBase/AppArmorProfiles will
- be tested to either work without modification to the policy or updated
+ https://wiki.ubuntu.com/SecurityTeam/KnowledgeBase/AppArmorProfiles have
+ been tested to either work without modification to the policy or updated
and tested to work with updated policy. Common rules will be added to
the apparmor base abstraction such that most packages shipping apparmor
policy will not require updating. These updates will be prepared, tested
and published en masse via a silo ppa.

** Also affects: linux (Ubuntu)
Importance: Undecided
Status: New

** Tags added: bot-stop-nagging

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https://bugs.launchpad.net/bugs/1298611

Title:
[FFe] apparmor signal and ptrace mediation

Status in “apparmor” package in Ubuntu:
New
Status in “linux” package in Ubuntu:
Incomplete

Bug description:
= linux =
This feature freeze exception is requested for signal and ptrace mediation via apparmor in the kernel. When used with a compatible apparmor userspace, signals and ptrace rules are supported. When used without a compatible apparmor userspace (eg, on a precise system with a trusty backport kernel), signal and ptrace mediation is not enforced (ie, you can use this kernel with an old userspace without any issues).

This feature is required to support comprehensive application
confinement on Ubuntu Touch (a separate pull will be requested at a
later date). This feature adds a significant security benefit to
libvirt's qemu guest isolation which is fundamental to Ubuntu on
Server/Cloud. This feature adds a welcome improvement to
administrators wishing to further protect their systems.

This feature has been tested on a 14.04 system with current kernel and
a 14.04 system with updated kernel capable of supporting signal and
ptrace mediation. This feature has been tested to work with on systems
using lxc containers.

This feature is required to support comprehensive application
confinement on Ubuntu Touch. This feature adds a significant security
benefit to libvirt's qemu guest isolation which is fundamental to
Ubuntu on Server/Cloud. This feature adds a welcome improvement to
administrators wishing to further protect their systems.

While the apparmor userspace and kernel changes to support signal and
ptrace mediation can happen at different times, the apparmor userspace
upload must correspond with uploads for packages that ship AppArmor
policy that require updates (eg, libvirt, lxc, etc). The packages
outlined in
https://wiki.ubuntu.com/SecurityTeam/KnowledgeBase/AppArmorProfiles
have been tested to either work without modification to the policy or
updated and tested to work with updated policy. Common rules will be
added to the apparmor base abstraction such that most packages
shipping apparmor policy will not require updating. These updates will
be prepared, tested and published en masse via a silo ppa.

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