mimblewimble team mailing list archive

[Fernando Nieto <fernandonm@xxxxxxxxx>]

> Note that for us, sending transactions straight to miners
> isn't necessarily all bad for privacy. It prevents anyone else
> from observing it, as it gets disaggregated in blocks (and
> potentially cut-through).

Incentivising users to use highly centralized mining pools as
trusted third parties is not the solution to achieve untraceability
in MimbleWimble. It is just a perverse mirage.



On 22 January 2018 at 22:13, Ignotus Peverell
<igno.peverell@xxxxxxxxxxxxxx> wrote:
> I don't necessarily agree with all these points but I won't argue either,
> given that I've gradually become cooler toward fee burning (pun intended).
>
> Certainly, all the points mentioned have some importance (I think Andrew
> Poelstra was the first to point out the additional incentive of submitting
> transactions straight to miners), but what resonates the strongest with me
> at this point is the difficulty to calculate exact supply. It turns out this
> is a very undesirable property, especially when it comes to a MimbleWimble
> implementation.
>
> So I'm okay with finally reverting that decision and having all fees go to
> miners, as typically done on most blockchains. As I was the biggest
> proponent of fee burning, I'm guessing few will object.
>
>
> - Igno
>
> P.S. Note that for us, sending transactions straight to miners isn't
> necessarily all bad for privacy. It prevents anyone else from observing it,
> as it gets disaggregated in blocks (and potentially cut-through).
>
> -------- Original Message --------
> On 22 January 2018 7:30 PM, Casey Rodarmor <casey@xxxxxxxxxxxx> wrote:
>
> Sorry, last bullet point should be:
>
> • It incentivizes pooled mining, since users will probably only
> submit transactions to the top N accelerators, if you're not in the
> top N pools, you're incentivized to join one to maximize your fees
>
> On Mon, Jan 22, 2018 at 8:21 PM, Casey Rodarmor casey@xxxxxxxxxxxx wrote:
>
> On Mon, Jan 22, 2018 at 11:59 AM, Fernando Nieto fernandonm@xxxxxxxxx wrote:
>
> Once blocks are full, even if you only burn part of the fees, what makes
> you think users will publish transactions with a fee greater than
> MIN_FEE, instead of sending a MIN_FEE transaction to a known miner and
> then splitting the rest of the fee (that would otherwise be burnt)
> between them?
>
> I'm curious what others think of this, but to me this is a really
> strong argument against burning fees.
> This would incentivize every miner to run transaction accelerators,
> which seems bad on a few fronts:
> • Accelerators are bad for privacy, since they give miners a chance to
> associate IPs with transactions
> • Accelerators require a bit of extra infrastructure, which means that
> miners won't be able to switch frictionlessly to and from mining Grin
> • It incentivizes pooled mining, since unless will probably only
> submit transactions to the top N accelerators, so if you're not in the
> top N pools, you're incentivized to join one to maximize your fees
>
>