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Re: sikkerheds brist i module systemet

 

On Wed, 1 Sep 1999, Jon Bendtsen wrote:

> 
> quote fra	http://www.kt.opensrc.org/kt19990830_32.html
> 
> kort fortalt. Hvis en cracker får adgang til din maskine er det RET let at
> loade et modul der vil give ham/hende adgang igen, samt skjule at
> vedkommende er der, ved at modificere systemkald i den kørende kerne. Det
> hele kan klares med et enkelt modul der bare skal loades.

Forudsætningen er at man er root. Det er kun root der kan udføre de
skridt, som skal til for at loade moduler, der ikke er "depmod'ede".

Quote: "When root has been compromised, all bets are off".

Sikringen består i at sikre at crackere *ikke* bliver root.

>      published, detailing some Linux exploits. Sven Koch gave a pointer to
>      http://www.phrack.com/search.phtml?view&article=p52-18, which gives
> in-depth explanations
>      (including code) of how to maintain control of a Linux system once
> it's been cracked. Elsewhere,

Kodeordene er her "maintain control".
 
Jeg var totalt paf da jeg læste om det angreb der var årsag til den
oprindelige diskussion. Udmærket at udbrede kendskabet.

Mads

-- 
Mads Bondo Dydensborg.                               madsdyd@xxxxxxxxxxxx
The IETF has an interesting enough life as is getting the too simple 
protocols to work sanely, hardware/software providers and sysadmins have a hard
time understanding, implementing and exploiting the too simple stuff today.
I.e., imagine MS-mess but on Internet scale, not just desktop-scale. If you
can. ... Scary. Real scary. Halloween stuff, definitely.
                                        - Dr. Horst H. von Brand



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