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[Martin Pitt <martin.pitt@xxxxxxxxxx>]

I pushed the fixes to trunk. Will do a new release and upload to wily
after beta freeze.

** Changed in: apport
       Status: In Progress => Fix Committed

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https://bugs.launchpad.net/bugs/1492570

Title:
  /usr/share/apport/kernel_crashdump accesses files in insecure manner

Status in Apport:
  Fix Committed
Status in apport package in Ubuntu:
  In Progress
Status in apport source package in Precise:
  Fix Released
Status in apport source package in Trusty:
  Fix Released
Status in apport source package in Vivid:
  Fix Released
Status in apport source package in Wily:
  In Progress

Bug description:
  On Ubuntu Vivid Linux distribution upstart or SysV init invokes the
  program /usr/share/apport/kernel_crashdump at boot to prepare crash
  dump files for sending. This action is performed with root privileges.
  As the crash dump directory /var/crash/ is world writable and
  kernel_crashdump performs file access in unsafe manner, any local user
  may trigger a denial of service or escalate to root privileges. If
  symlink and hardlink protection is enabled (which should be the
  default for any modern system), only denial of service is possible.

  Problematic syscall in kernel_crashdump is:

  open("/var/crash/linux-image-3.19.0-18-generic.0.crash", O_WRONLY|O_CREAT|O_TRUNC|O_LARGEFILE|O_CLOEXEC, 0666) = 30
  ...
  open("/var/crash/vmcore.log", O_RDONLY|O_LARGEFILE|O_CLOEXEC) = 31

  Thus the output file is opened unconditionally and without O_EXCL or
  O_NOFOLLOW. Also opening of input file does not care about links.

  By sym- or hardlinking from the predictable dump file name to the
  vmcore.log, kernel_crashdump will recursively include its own dump as
  logfile, thus filling the disk. This also works with symlink and
  hardlink protection turned on.

  By symlinking to other files (with symlink protection off), arbitrary
  files can be overwritten to gain root privileges.

  # lsb_release -rd
  Description:    Ubuntu 15.04
  Release:        15.04

  # apt-cache policy apport
  apport:
    Installed: 2.17.2-0ubuntu1.3
    Candidate: 2.17.2-0ubuntu1.3
    Version table:
   *** 2.17.2-0ubuntu1.3 0
          500 http://archive.ubuntu.com/ubuntu/ vivid-updates/main i386 Packages
          100 /var/lib/dpkg/status
       2.17.2-0ubuntu1.1 0
          500 http://archive.ubuntu.com/ubuntu/ vivid-security/main i386 Packages
       2.17.2-0ubuntu1 0
          500 http://archive.ubuntu.com/ubuntu/ vivid/main i386 Packages

  
  See http://www.halfdog.net/Security/2015/ApportKernelCrashdumpFileAccessVulnerabilities/ for more information and follow the link on the bottom if you know what you are doing (user: InvitedOnly, pass: w0f63smR).

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  may be passed on (including password) to other security engineers
  under the same conditions at your own risk. Free circulation
  of that resource is allowed as soon as password protection was
  removed or when stated on the page itself.
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