touch-packages team mailing list archive

[Jamie Strandboge <jamie@xxxxxxxxxx>]

Is this actually an issue for confined apps? Mirco and I looked at this
before and I thought there was a separate DBus API for snap decisions.
Apps aren't allowed to use snap decisions IIRC, but may use the push-
notification-client policy group:

# Description: Can use push notifications as a client
# Usage: common

dbus (receive, send)
     bus=session
     interface=com.ubuntu.PushNotifications
     path=/com/ubuntu/PushNotifications/@{APP_PKGNAME_DBUS}{,/**},

dbus (receive, send)
     bus=session
     interface=com.ubuntu.Postal
     path=/com/ubuntu/Postal/@{APP_PKGNAME_DBUS}{,/**},

Are snap decisions somehow following under the above paths/interfaces?

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https://bugs.launchpad.net/bugs/1306769

Title:
  pinlock snap decision potentially allows malicious app to gain access
  to user PIN and Passcode

Status in Server and client library for desktop notifications in Unity:
  Triaged
Status in The Unity 8 shell:
  Triaged
Status in “unity8” package in Ubuntu:
  Triaged

Bug description:
  Currently the pinlock dialog is implemented as snapdecision and thus
  any application that is allowed to use the notifications can
  potentially trick the user to provide his PIN code or Passcode to the
  application by invoking the pinlock dialog.

  As we want to allow applications to send normal notifications and
  snapdecisions we can't just block the whole notify service from them,
  but also we don't have any means to block just one of them.

  Thus the only solution is to remove the pinlock from snap decisions
  completely and implement a standalone dbus service for pinlock dialog
  which can be properly confined.

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