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Message #02083
[Bug 1129713] Re: Validation of PKI tokens bypasses revocation check
** Changed in: keystone/folsom
Status: Fix Committed => Fix Released
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https://bugs.launchpad.net/bugs/1129713
Title:
Validation of PKI tokens bypasses revocation check
Status in OpenStack Identity (Keystone):
Invalid
Status in Keystone folsom series:
Fix Released
Bug description:
for PKI tokens, we are bypassing token.get_token() call and therefore
skipping the “valid=True” check.
In Grizzly, this code is in keystone/token/controllers.py
In Folsom, this code is in keystone/service.py
The if block bypasses the backend check. It is in the backend where
tokens are checked for revocation.
def _get_token_ref(self, context, token_id, belongs_to=None):
"""Returns a token if a valid one exists.
Optionally, limited to a token owned by a specific tenant.
"""
# TODO(termie): this stuff should probably be moved to middleware
self.assert_admin(context)
if cms.is_ans1_token(token_id):
data = json.loads(cms.cms_verify(cms.token_to_cms(token_id),
CONF.signing.certfile,
CONF.signing.ca_certs))
data['access']['token']['user'] = data['access']['user']
data['access']['token']['metadata'] = data['access']['metadata']
if belongs_to:
assert data['access']['token']['tenant']['id'] == belongs_to
token_ref = data['access']['token']
else:
token_ref = self.token_api.get_token(context=context,
token_id=token_id)
return token_ref
The exposure is limited to people that are passing the whole PKI token
back for validation via the web service.
This PKI tokens were supposed to be validated primarily via Crypto,
but there is an option to validate them against the live server as
well. It is only this last code path that is affected. It is
unlikely to be triggered in Folsom, as people have to make a
deliberate decision to use PKI tokens, and are unlikely to be
validating them against the Keystone server.
Remote services can choose to pass a Hash of the PKI token to the
validate Web API, which web services are likely to do, as the Hash is
short enough to fit in a cookie. The Hash is then it looked up using
the backend get_token() behavior and works correctly.
It does not effect the keystone calls that first require validating
the token. For example if a user runs tenant_list against their own
account, using a PKI token, they do
token_ref = self.token_api.get_token(context=context,
token_id=context['token_id'])
This was discovered by Guang Yee.
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