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[Luke Hinds <lhinds@xxxxxxxxxx>]

will add a docs bug for this issue.

** Changed in: ossn
       Status: New => Won't Fix

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https://bugs.launchpad.net/bugs/1618615

Title:
  Potential information disclosure in EC2 "credentials"

Status in OpenStack Identity (keystone):
  New
Status in OpenStack Security Advisory:
  Won't Fix
Status in OpenStack Security Notes:
  Won't Fix

Bug description:
  When creating a "credential" in Keystone, instead of using
  uuid.uuid4() like in most places to generate a unique identifier, the
  id is created from the SHA256 hash value of whatever is passed in as
  the "access" key in the POST request (Code here:
  https://github.com/openstack/keystone/blob/master/keystone/credential/controllers.py#L36-L60)

  ===== EXAMPLE REQUEST =====

      POST /v3/credentials HTTP/1.1
      Host: [ENDPOINT]
      X-Auth-Token: [ADMIN TOKEN]
      Content-Length: 231
      Content-Type: application/json

      {
          "credential": {
              "blob": "{\"access\":\"<script>alert(2)</script>\",\"secret\":\"secretKey\"}",
              "project_id": "12345",
              "type": "ec2",
              "user_id": "12345"
          }
      }

      HTTP/1.1 201 Created
      Date: Tue, 30 Aug 2016 19:14:54 GMT
      Server: Apache/2.4.7 (Ubuntu)
      Vary: X-Auth-Token
      Content-Length: 383
      Content-Type: application/json

      {"credential": {"user_id": "12345", "links": {"self":
  "[ENDPOINT]/v3/credentials/141ce7a938b5973dd71c90bcdd7e4097317ee7374259cf6d8774fdfd86c1f8ea"},
  "blob":
  "{\"access\":\"<script>alert(2)</script>\",\"secret\":\"secretKey\"}",
  "project_id": "12345", "type": "ec2", "id":
  "141ce7a938b5973dd71c90bcdd7e4097317ee7374259cf6d8774fdfd86c1f8ea"}}

  ===== /EXAMPLE =====

  The id from the example above is
  "141ce7a938b5973dd71c90bcdd7e4097317ee7374259cf6d8774fdfd86c1f8ea",
  which is the same as the SHA256 value of "<script>alert(2)</script>"
  (you can test this with `echo -n "<script>alert(2)</script>" | openssl
  dgst -sha256` on *nix)

  The documentation here seems to show MD5s and possibly tenant IDs used
  as "access" values: http://developer.openstack.org/api-
  ref/identity/v3/?expanded=assign-role-to-user-on-projects-owned-by-
  domain-detail,create-policy-detail,show-credential-details-detail
  ,list-credentials-detail,create-credential-detail#list-credentials

  Bruteforcing an actual MD5 isn't a huge security risk (i.e. trying to
  predict all 32 characters from thin air), but if the MD5 is a hash of
  a known value (i.e. the string "admin"), it would be trivial to test
  for common values:

      md5(admin) = 21232f297a57a5a743894a0e4a801fc3
      sha256(21232f297a57a5a743894a0e4a801fc3) = 465c194afb65670f38322df087f0a9bb225cc257e43eb4ac5a0c98ef5b3173ac

  If tenant IDs are used, this task becomes even easier: just generate
  SHA256 hashes for 0 - 999999

  A non-admin user can determine whether there are credentials using a
  given access key by attempting to access the resource from its sha256
  url identifier:

  ===== EXAMPLE REQUESTS =====

  Existing credential

      GET /v3/credentials/141ce7a938b5973dd71c90bcdd7e4097317ee7374259cf6d8774fdfd86c1f8ea HTTP/1.1
      Host: [ENDPOINT]
      X-Auth-Token: [NON-ADMIN TOKEN]
      Content-Type: application/json
      Connection: close

      HTTP/1.1 403 Forbidden
      Date: Tue, 30 Aug 2016 19:55:24 GMT
      Server: Apache/2.4.7 (Ubuntu)
      Vary: X-Auth-Token
      Content-Length: 140
      Content-Type: application/json

      {"error": {"message": "You are not authorized to perform the
  requested action: identity:get_credential", "code": 403, "title":
  "Forbidden"}}

  Non-existent credential

      GET /v3/credentials/deadbeef HTTP/1.1
      Host: [ENDPOINT]
      X-Auth-Token: [NON-ADMIN TOKEN]
      Content-Type: application/json

      HTTP/1.1 404 Not Found
      Date: Tue, 30 Aug 2016 20:03:38 GMT
      Server: Apache/2.4.7 (Ubuntu)
      Vary: X-Auth-Token
      Content-Length: 96
      Content-Type: application/json

      {"error": {"message": "Could not find credential: deadbeef",
  "code": 404, "title": "Not Found"}}

  ===== /EXAMPLE =====

  It is also possible to get a 500 error by creating a credential with
  an invalid character in the "access" key:

  ===== EXAMPLE REQUEST =====

      POST /v3/credentials HTTP/1.1
      Host: [ENDPOINT]
      X-Auth-Token: [ADMIN TOKEN]
      Content-Length: 212
      Content-Type: application/json

      {
          "credential": {
              "blob": "{\"access\":\"\uffff\",\"secret\":\"secretKey\"}",
              "project_id": "12345",
              "type": "ec2",
              "user_id": "12345"
          }
      }

      HTTP/1.1 500 Internal Server Error
      Date: Tue, 30 Aug 2016 20:06:16 GMT
      Server: Apache/2.4.7 (Ubuntu)
      Vary: X-Auth-Token
      Content-Length: 143
      Content-Type: application/json

      {"error": {"message": "An unexpected error prevented the server
  from fulfilling your request.", "code": 500, "title": "Internal Server
  Error"}}

  ===== /EXAMPLE =====

  I'm unsure what the security impact would be here, mainly because of
  the ambiguous examples provided in the Keystone API documentation
  (linked above). If either of the 2 scenarios I outlined is a
  reasonable use case (i.e. MD5 of a guessable value, or tenant IDs),
  there may be a risk of information leakage by brute-force. It would
  also be possible to prevent others from creating credentials with a
  given access key by simply creating lots of credentials in Keystone
  with predictable access keys. This would cause a collision whenever
  attempting to create a credential set with an access key that has
  already been used.

  If, on the other hand, the credentials are always in the format
  described by AWS here ( link:
  https://docs.aws.amazon.com/AWSSimpleQueueService/latest/SQSGettingStartedGuide/AWSCredentials.html
  ), it would require a huge number of requests to bruteforce the access
  key (though it would not be impossible). However, it would be
  possible, using the approach described above with a regular user
  token, to determine whether a known EC2 access key was in place as a
  credential in a given Keystone database.

  I'm unclear on the utility of using SHA256 for the identifier at all
  here, since random UUIDs would make this potential issue moot.

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