launchpad-dev team mailing list archive

[Max Bowsher <maxb@xxxxxxx>]

Bjorn Tillenius wrote:
> On Mon, Mar 15, 2010 at 01:23:33PM +0000, Jonathan Lange wrote:
>> On Sun, Mar 14, 2010 at 9:45 PM, Michael Hudson
>> <michael.hudson@xxxxxxxxxxxxx> wrote:
>>> Jonathan Lange wrote:
>>>> Hello,
>>>>
>> ...
>>>> I'd like to upgrade zope.testing and take advantage of their better
>>>> subunit support, but that requires upgrading subunit too.
>>>>
>>>> We currently maintain subunit as a sourcecode dependency. We manage it
>>>> in the branch lp:~launchpad-pqm/subunit/trunk. That branch is a
>>>> KnitPackRepository. subunit trunk is a 2a repository.
>>>>
>>>> If I naively change sourcedeps.conf like so:
>>>> @@ -12,7 +12,7 @@
>>>> -subunit lp:~launchpad-pqm/subunit/trunk;revno=61
>>>> +subunit lp:~subunit/subunit/trunk;revno=120
>>>>
>>>> I get incompatible repository errors.
>>>>
>>>> subunit is not a Python package. It's built with autotools, and thus
>>>> making an egg for it is beyond my ken and maybe inappropriate.
>>>>
>>>> Which leaves me with a bunch of questions:
>>>>
>>>> 1. Changing sourcedeps.conf to point to a branch that's not managed by
>>>> our PQM is OK, isn't it? After all, we still have to pass the tests to
>>>> change the revno of the branch, so we aren't losing any safety afaict.
>>> As Max said, we are losing some safety.  Not sure how much or how much
>>> we care.
>>>
>> I think we don't care.
> 
> I think we should care, since this opens up the possibility for people
> to change what is being run on our production systems, without us
> knowing about it. Sure, for this particular branch it should be safe.
> But it's easier to have a policy of "point only to branches owned by
> ~launchpad-pqm", rather than "point only to branches owned by
> ~launchpad-pqm, unless we trust the branch". The latters leaves an
> example that it's ok to point to foreign branches that we don't have any
> control of.

If we ever did want to be able to track an upstream's branch without
having to manage a pqm-trusted mirror, then I think the way to do it
would be:

lp:~subunit/subunit/trunk;revision-id=robertc@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx-20100311211210-h7b7ajkd6sz1ayzr;testament-sha1=6cc557aef62eee2e34b7ea296f374b0b0277a922

Verbose though that is, it's required to affirm that someone hasn't
maliciously forged a revision with the same revid as the previous tip,
but including malicious changes.

Max.

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