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[Édouard Thuleau <thuleau@xxxxxxxxx>]

And if you use libvirt virt driver, the hypervisor (libvirt+KVM in my case)
adds anti MAC and IP spoofing rules on VNICs of VM:

$ virsh nwfilter-list
UUID                                  Name
----------------------------------------------------------------
991dbd1a-373b-a005-57b2-5b1f4107f653  allow-arp
aefdae18-56e8-4e67-c8f1-cc826e2c519c  allow-dhcp
f1e80828-1b4b-dcb3-4136-faaf5beab9e2  allow-dhcp-server
9e497c96-ec4a-4ad8-fcbb-d2917e3af70a  allow-incoming-ipv4
4d998884-5870-8956-5585-d34f77231e3e  allow-ipv4
7a4233d3-1fa8-6eb1-f2e8-3e55f773da0d  clean-traffic
fae01ed3-2bd5-e6b4-a63e-daa336655c20  no-arp-ip-spoofing
bf61b4b4-f844-6c36-9bb7-6245b642b0cb  no-arp-mac-spoofing
04cc5d54-08a0-31ca-4b5e-79a2e96d276b  no-arp-spoofing
255d63a3-12a7-32b9-dffb-a2d61c8fcb39  no-ip-multicast
a0e9b6f3-e099-2b0b-7d4b-69e63587fa39  no-ip-spoofing
83145355-39d1-9dce-4012-3032c110cf82  no-mac-broadcast
653c47ed-48f0-25ea-bf18-1153a58d3773  no-mac-spoofing
cc460af0-ee60-7ca8-c09e-a074490711ac  no-other-l2-traffic
5df592f3-dcff-e0f3-73ac-d2eb3baeda11  no-other-rarp-traffic
891e4787-e5c0-d59b-cbd6-41bc3c6b36fc  nova-allow-dhcp-server
418f4ad6-d997-b483-15d9-c7c2c21b4eba  nova-base
fdc1ee23-05a1-0303-6d24-8a300bd57f21
 nova-instance-instance-00000004-fa163e3ec9b3
e8cd7fa5-2de9-cfe1-f24f-8a449043c6f3
 nova-instance-instance-00000005-fa163ed87bff
16e11cd9-6e17-3c91-6776-e3bffc70e94b
 nova-instance-instance-00000006-fa163ecd666a
c5ba020f-6b6f-d511-8ee1-2e2b49497431
 nova-instance-instance-00000007-fa163e1d4e38
2d085283-a4bf-79f8-80f1-20498b8cc475
 nova-instance-instance-00000018-fa163ee1842c
7d4bb9f1-597e-2a36-e340-45ec710b4481
 nova-instance-instance-00000088-fa163ef641ad
79ef4d25-ff42-fd63-f34b-fc1079c391b3  nova-nodhcp
c5ac3035-ac46-3870-ff5c-296b5f4221d3  nova-vpn
b615cae6-4ca8-882f-42e1-9de541e4844b  qemu-announce-self
b34d17b0-30d6-75c4-19d0-e636d1f99160  qemu-announce-self-rarp

The virt driver is control by Nova, so is that Nova should be responsible
for network security? Perhaps it could be disabled? But if we disable it,
is that Quantum takes good care?

Édouard.


On Wed, May 1, 2013 at 7:14 AM, Joe Topjian <joe.topjian@xxxxxxxxx> wrote:

> Thank you both for the information.
>
> I see that the compute node has some iptables rules for the instance --
> one in particular that filters the instance's mac address -- but deleting
> this rule doesn't resolve the issue. So my guess is that it's the flow
> table that Salvatore mentioned which is ultimately controlling the
> filtering.
>
> At the moment, I don't know enough about open vswitch to make custom
> changes to the flow table. For now, setting the bridge's mac address as the
> same mac of the virtual interface is a good work around.
>
> Thanks again,
> Joe
>
>
> On Tue, Apr 30, 2013 at 5:57 PM, Salvatore Orlando <sorlando@xxxxxxxxxx>wrote:
>
>> I was not aware that security groups for OVS already enforced anti
>> spoofing rules.
>> That's good to know.
>>
>> Salvatore
>>
>>
>> On 1 May 2013 00:55, Aaron Rosen <arosen@xxxxxxxxxx> wrote:
>>
>>> Also, the security group stuff locks down the port to be the mac+ip of
>>> the quantum port mac+ip. If you create a new bridge and add ethX to it
>>> you'll also have to set the mac on your bridge to be the same as ethX
>>> (which is the mac that quantum handed out).
>>>
>>> Aaron
>>>
>>>
>>> On Tue, Apr 30, 2013 at 4:25 PM, Salvatore Orlando <sorlando@xxxxxxxxxx>wrote:
>>>
>>>> Hi Joe,
>>>>
>>>> are you using the OVS plugin with GRE overlays?
>>>> In that case your problem might be the fact that the plugin pushes a
>>>> OVS flow entry which applies the 'local' vlan tag only to packet directed
>>>> to the VM's mac [1]
>>>>
>>>> To me, this does not look like a bug; it's probably intended behaviour,
>>>> as it kind of implements mac spoofing prevention. In the future we might
>>>> also expect stricter anti-spoof checking; on the other side a change
>>>> for administratively enabling promiscuos mode might be welcome - this
>>>> should allow you to do nested OVS.
>>>>
>>>> Salvatore
>>>>
>>>> [1]
>>>> https://github.com/openstack/quantum/blob/master/quantum/plugins/openvswitch/agent/ovs_quantum_agent.py#L448
>>>>
>>>>
>>>>
>>>> On 30 April 2013 22:08, Joe Topjian <joe.topjian@xxxxxxxxx> wrote:
>>>>
>>>>> Hello,
>>>>>
>>>>> I have OpenStack (Grizzly) up and running with Quantum. I'm using the
>>>>> Open vSwitch plugin, per-tenant routing, and network namespaces. As far as
>>>>> I'm aware, this is all set up correctly as instances that I create are able
>>>>> to retrieve an IP address via DHCP, reach the metadata server, and reach
>>>>> the outside internet.
>>>>>
>>>>> The issue that I'm running into is that when I install Open vSwitch on
>>>>> the instance itself, I'm unable to create working bridges. For example:
>>>>>
>>>>> ovs-vsctl add-br br-eth0
>>>>> ovs-vsctl add-port br-eth0 eth0
>>>>> (swap IPs from eth0 to br-eth0, kill dhcp, etc etc)
>>>>>
>>>>> Traffic isn't flowing properly, though.
>>>>>
>>>>> If I run a continuous ping and run tcpdump on both the instance and
>>>>> the tap interface on the controller, I see arp requests going out of the
>>>>> instance, being received on the tap interface, the tap interface sending a
>>>>> reply, but the reply never reaching the instance.
>>>>>
>>>>> However, I have found that if I create a bridge with the same MAC as
>>>>> the interface that I'm adding to the bridge, traffic flows correctly:
>>>>>
>>>>> ovs-vsctl set bridge br-eth0 other-config:hwaddr=aa:bb:cc:00:11:22
>>>>>
>>>>> My best guess is that there's something (L2) blocking the flow of
>>>>> traffic, but I'm not exactly sure where to start looking. I think it's safe
>>>>> to assume that Open vSwitch on the OpenStack servers is doing the blocking
>>>>> but I think it's Quantum that's implementing the blocking since if I use
>>>>> Open vSwitch with nova-network, this problem doesn't happen.
>>>>>
>>>>> Does anyone have any pointers? Or even a fix?
>>>>>
>>>>> Thanks,
>>>>> Joe
>>>>>
>>>>> --
>>>>> Joe Topjian
>>>>> Systems Administrator
>>>>> Cybera Inc.
>>>>>
>>>>> www.cybera.ca
>>>>>
>>>>> Cybera is a not-for-profit organization that works to spur and
>>>>> support innovation, for the economic benefit of Alberta, through the use
>>>>> of cyberinfrastructure.
>>>>>
>>>>> _______________________________________________
>>>>> Mailing list: https://launchpad.net/~openstack
>>>>> Post to     : openstack@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx
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>>>>>
>>>>>
>>>>
>>>> _______________________________________________
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>>>>
>>>>
>>>
>>
>
>
> --
> Joe Topjian
> Systems Administrator
> Cybera Inc.
>
> www.cybera.ca
>
> Cybera is a not-for-profit organization that works to spur and support
> innovation, for the economic benefit of Alberta, through the use
> of cyberinfrastructure.
>
> _______________________________________________
> Mailing list: https://launchpad.net/~openstack
> Post to     : openstack@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx
> Unsubscribe : https://launchpad.net/~openstack
> More help   : https://help.launchpad.net/ListHelp
>
>