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[Launchpad Bug Tracker <1371170@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx>]

This bug was fixed in the package apparmor-easyprof-ubuntu - 1.2.35

---------------
apparmor-easyprof-ubuntu (1.2.35) utopic; urgency=medium

  * ubuntu/1.2/push-notification-client: don't deny access to the clipboard
    since sdk apps are supposed to be able to specify this policy group
  * ubuntu/1.2: add ubuntu-push-helper for push-helpers to use which (among
    other things) explicitly disables access to the clipboard (LP: #1371170)
  * adjust autopackagetest for ubuntu-push-helper
  * ubuntu/accounts: allow all on org.freedesktop.DBus.Properties for
    /com/google/code/AccountsSSO/SingleSignOn
  * ubuntu/1.2/ubuntu-scope-network, pending/ubuntu-scope-local-content: also
    add remaining libhybris paths (/{,var/}run/shm/hybris_shm_data and
    /system/build.prop)
  * ubuntu/ubuntu-sdk: explicitly disallow gsettings (dconf) access
    (LP: #1378115)
 -- Jamie Strandboge <jamie@xxxxxxxxxx>   Mon, 06 Oct 2014 10:41:18 -0500

** Changed in: apparmor-easyprof-ubuntu (Ubuntu)
       Status: In Progress => Fix Released

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https://bugs.launchpad.net/bugs/1371170

Title:
  information disclosure: clipboard contents can be obtained without
  user knowledge

Status in Mir:
  New
Status in “apparmor-easyprof-ubuntu” package in Ubuntu:
  Fix Released
Status in “content-hub” package in Ubuntu:
  New
Status in “mir” package in Ubuntu:
  New
Status in “unity8” package in Ubuntu:
  New

Bug description:
  Currently, the clipboard is implemented such that all apps can access
  the contents at any time. The clipboard contents should only be given
  to apps based on user driven input (eg, a paste operation).

  Attack scenario:
  1. user launches malicious app 'baz' that polls the clipboard for contents
  2. user launches legitimate app 'foo', at which point 'baz' is backgrounded
  3. user selects some text and puts it into the clipboard
  4. user opens legitimate app 'bar' and pastes text
  5. user foregrounds 'baz' which now has access to the clipboard contents

  In the above, users can understand that 'foo' and 'bar' have access to
  the text put in the clipboard. However, it is unexpected that 'baz'
  also has access since the user didn't paste the text into it.

  As it is currently implemented, there is no clipboard timeout, so the
  contents will persist through the session (unless changed by another
  copy operation). Application lifecycle will help a little, but not
  fully since whenever an app is foregrounded, it can the contents of
  the keyboard.

  In the short term, we should require that only a foregrounded app
  whould be able to get clipboard contents. Push helpers should have an
  explicit deny to the (upcoming) DBus clipboard access. Background apps
  should not be allowed to push content into the clipboard (application
  lifecycle deals with this, but we need this for the future).

  Ideally this would be handled via wholly user-driven interactions.
  While this could be achieved via keyboard driven interactions, it is
  difficult with toolkit driven interactions (ie, 'Paste' from a menu is
  necessarily a pull operation). One idea is not to block access but
  instead make users aware of the clipboard access (eg, an overlay that
  says "Pasted from clipboard" and then fades out)-- this should be as
  unobtrusive as possible.

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