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Message #03744
Re: Click packages and source code
Right... what about a "Save to dropbox" usecase, "Open the email in a
browser", etc?
Zisu Andrei
On 13 August 2013 17:34, Jamie Strandboge <jamie@xxxxxxxxxxxxx> wrote:
> On 08/13/2013 11:23 AM, Zisu Andrei wrote:
> > Take this situation: on app1 user taps "log in with facebook", app1
> takes user
> > to app2 where he logs in to facebook with his account and approves app1,
> now
> > app2 takes the user back to app1, where app1 is fed a response from app2
> with
> > the access tokens required to access the user's data.
> >
> > How would it work with the current no-app-to-app-calls model?
> >
>
> app1 can't "take the user to app2". If app1 wants to connect to facebook,
> it
> must specify the "accounts" policy group in the manifest and use online
> accounts
> to get the tokens (and when this online accounts work lands (soon), the
> user
> will be prompted on if app1 can connect to facebook (after which, online
> accounts will cache the result)).
>
> > Zisu Andrei
> >
> >
> > On 13 August 2013 17:04, Jamie Strandboge <jamie@xxxxxxxxxxxxx
> > <mailto:jamie@xxxxxxxxxxxxx>> wrote:
> >
> > On 08/13/2013 08:33 AM, Michael Zanetti wrote:
> > > On Tuesday 13 August 2013 10:01:58 Sergio Schvezov wrote:
> > >> On Tue, Aug 13, 2013 at 9:33 AM, Michael Zanetti <
> > >>
> > >> michael.zanetti@xxxxxxxxxxxxx <mailto:
> michael.zanetti@xxxxxxxxxxxxx>> wrote:
> > >>> Hi,
> > >>>
> > >>> I've just been watching this demo [1] on how to publish click
> packages.
> > >>> Looks
> > >>> very promising! However, one question that comes up here is at
> the
> > >>> uploading
> > >>> step (3:13 in the video):
> > >>>
> > >>> The website allows to upload a binary package and a source
> package.
> > >>> However, I
> > >>> can't see any connection between those two. How can I be sure
> that the
> > >>> binary
> > >>> click package indeed contains an unmodified version of the
> uploaded source
> > >>> package? From what I can see here I could easily publish some
> source code
> > >>> and
> > >>> then build a malicious package containing some additional bad
> code.
> > >>
> > >> You will be confined by apparmor here and very limited in the bad
> things
> > >> you can do.
> > >
> > > I don't agree here. I'm not entirely sure how AppArmor works, but
> I assume it
> > > would block access to, for instance, my address book. If I still
> want to use
> > > that app there must be some place where I can grant permissions to
> an app to
> > > access my address book. This is where I would like to know what
> the package
> > > actually does with my address book and where I would need to rely
> on the fact
> > > that the binary package is indeed an *unpatched* version of the
> uploaded
> > > source package.
> > >
> > Click packages will be confined by AppArmor[1] and there is a
> permissions model
> > where developers declare what the click package can do[2]. Apps are
> quite
> > confined by default by design and they are not allowed to access
> other app's
> > data, among other things. This is to prevent malicious apps from
> doing harm to
> > the system or obtaining the user's data. Application developers will
> need to
> > used published APIs to access things like locations, online
> accounts, the
> > addressbook, etc and these APIs will be supported in the click
> manifest. Access
> > to data like the address book will be limited and handled via an out
> of process
> > helper which may also help mediate the access (ie, provide a
> contextual runtime
> > prompt). That's the good news-- the bad news is that not all of
> these APIs are
> > implemented today, but they are being worked on. I'll let others
> comment on
> > their status.
> >
> > More specifically to your question-- click packages and the app
> store will
> > support binary only uploads of packages. With this in mind, it isn't
> > particularly useful to have a build server from a security point of
> view because
> > a malicious app author would simply not upload the source to avoid
> detection. A
> > build could be useful for other reasons-- such as to make sure that
> the app is
> > built in a clean environment, etc, but I'll let others comment on
> that too.
> >
> > [1]
> https://wiki.ubuntu.com/SecurityTeam/Specifications/ApplicationConfinement
> > [2]
> https://wiki.ubuntu.com/SecurityTeam/Specifications/ApplicationConfinement/Manifest#Click
> > --
> > Jamie Strandboge http://www.ubuntu.com/
> >
> >
> > --
> > Mailing list: https://launchpad.net/~ubuntu-phone
> > Post to : ubuntu-phone@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx
> > <mailto:ubuntu-phone@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx>
> > Unsubscribe : https://launchpad.net/~ubuntu-phone
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> >
> >
> >
> >
>
>
> --
> Jamie Strandboge http://www.ubuntu.com/
>
>
> --
> Mailing list: https://launchpad.net/~ubuntu-phone
> Post to : ubuntu-phone@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx
> Unsubscribe : https://launchpad.net/~ubuntu-phone
> More help : https://help.launchpad.net/ListHelp
>
>
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