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Message #25708
[Bug 1341954] Re: suds client subject to cache poisoning by local attacker
This has been published as OSSN-0038 to the openstack and openstack-dev
mailing lists as well as the wiki:
https://wiki.openstack.org/wiki/OSSN/OSSN-0038
** Changed in: ossn
Status: In Progress => Fix Released
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https://bugs.launchpad.net/bugs/1341954
Title:
suds client subject to cache poisoning by local attacker
Status in Cinder:
Fix Released
Status in Cinder havana series:
Fix Released
Status in Cinder icehouse series:
Fix Released
Status in Gantt:
New
Status in OpenStack Compute (Nova):
Fix Released
Status in Oslo VMware library for OpenStack projects:
Fix Released
Status in OpenStack Security Advisories:
Won't Fix
Status in OpenStack Security Notes:
Fix Released
Bug description:
The suds project appears to be largely unmaintained upstream. The default cache implementation stores pickled objects to a predictable path in /tmp. This can be used by a local attacker to redirect SOAP requests via symlinks or run a privilege escalation / code execution attack via a pickle exploit.
cinder/requirements.txt:suds>=0.4
gantt/requirements.txt:suds>=0.4
nova/requirements.txt:suds>=0.4
oslo.vmware/requirements.txt:suds>=0.4
The details are available here -
https://bugzilla.redhat.com/show_bug.cgi?id=978696
(CVE-2013-2217)
Although this is an unlikely attack vector steps should be taken to
prevent this behaviour. Potential ways to fix this are by explicitly
setting the cache location to a directory created via
tempfile.mkdtemp(), disabling cache client.set_options(cache=None), or
using a custom cache implementation that doesn't load / store pickled
objects from an insecure location.
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