yahoo-eng-team team mailing list archive

[Tristan Cacqueray <tdecacqu@xxxxxxxxxx>]

Since this report concerns a possible security risk, an incomplete
security advisory task has been added while the core security reviewers
for the affected project or projects confirm the bug and discuss the
scope of any vulnerability along with potential solutions.

It seems like a class D type of bug (e.g., hardening opportunity)
according to VMT taxonomy ( https://security.openstack.org/vmt-
process.html#incident-report-taxonomy ).

** Also affects: ossa
   Importance: Undecided
       Status: New

** Changed in: ossa
       Status: New => Incomplete

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https://bugs.launchpad.net/bugs/1611171

Title:
  re-runs self via sudo

Status in Cinder:
  New
Status in Designate:
  In Progress
Status in ec2-api:
  New
Status in gce-api:
  New
Status in Manila:
  New
Status in masakari:
  New
Status in OpenStack Compute (nova):
  New
Status in OpenStack Security Advisory:
  Incomplete
Status in Rally:
  New

Bug description:
  Hello, I'm looking through Designate source code to determine if is
  appropriate to include in Ubuntu Main. This isn't a full security
  audit.

  This looks like trouble:

  ./designate/cmd/manage.py

  def main():
      CONF.register_cli_opt(category_opt)

      try:
          utils.read_config('designate', sys.argv)
          logging.setup(CONF, 'designate')
      except cfg.ConfigFilesNotFoundError:
          cfgfile = CONF.config_file[-1] if CONF.config_file else None
          if cfgfile and not os.access(cfgfile, os.R_OK):
              st = os.stat(cfgfile)
              print(_("Could not read %s. Re-running with sudo") % cfgfile)
              try:
                  os.execvp('sudo', ['sudo', '-u', '#%s' % st.st_uid] + sys.argv)
              except Exception:
                  print(_('sudo failed, continuing as if nothing happened'))

          print(_('Please re-run designate-manage as root.'))
          sys.exit(2)

  
  This is an interesting decision -- if the configuration file is _not_ readable by the user in question, give the executing user complete privileges of the user that owns the unreadable file.

  I'm not a fan of hiding privilege escalation / modifications in
  programs -- if a user had recently used sudo and thus had the
  authentication token already stored for their terminal, this 'hidden'
  use of sudo may be unexpected and unwelcome, especially since it
  appears that argv from the first call leaks through to the sudo call.

  Is this intentional OpenStack style? Or unexpected for you guys too?

  (Feel free to make this public at your convenience.)

  Thanks

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