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[OpenStack Infra <1611171@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx>]

Reviewed:  https://review.openstack.org/368319
Committed: https://git.openstack.org/cgit/openstack/masakari/commit/?id=53d9c2613d734a48b0f0b30944bfd47ef5c1b06f
Submitter: Jenkins
Branch:    master

commit 53d9c2613d734a48b0f0b30944bfd47ef5c1b06f
Author: Takashi Kajinami <kajinamit@xxxxxxxxxxxxx>
Date:   Tue Sep 6 11:07:23 2016 +0900

    Don't attempt to escalate masakari-manage privileges
    
    Remove code which allowed masakari-manage to attempt to escalate
    privileges so that configuration files can be read by users who
    normally wouldn't have access, but do have sudo access.
    
    NOTE:
    This change is create based on the change with change id
    I03063d2af14015e6506f1b6e958f5ff219aa4a87 from Kiall Mac Innes
    in designate project.
    
    Change-Id: Icba07a4bac4f41b921984204b32ad73fdbae4097
    Co-Authored-By: Kiall Mac Innes <kiall@xxxxxxxxxxx>
    Closes-Bug: 1611171


** Changed in: masakari
       Status: In Progress => Fix Released

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https://bugs.launchpad.net/bugs/1611171

Title:
  re-runs self via sudo

Status in Cinder:
  New
Status in Designate:
  In Progress
Status in ec2-api:
  New
Status in gce-api:
  New
Status in Manila:
  New
Status in masakari:
  Fix Released
Status in OpenStack Compute (nova):
  In Progress
Status in OpenStack Security Advisory:
  Incomplete
Status in Rally:
  New

Bug description:
  Hello, I'm looking through Designate source code to determine if is
  appropriate to include in Ubuntu Main. This isn't a full security
  audit.

  This looks like trouble:

  ./designate/cmd/manage.py

  def main():
      CONF.register_cli_opt(category_opt)

      try:
          utils.read_config('designate', sys.argv)
          logging.setup(CONF, 'designate')
      except cfg.ConfigFilesNotFoundError:
          cfgfile = CONF.config_file[-1] if CONF.config_file else None
          if cfgfile and not os.access(cfgfile, os.R_OK):
              st = os.stat(cfgfile)
              print(_("Could not read %s. Re-running with sudo") % cfgfile)
              try:
                  os.execvp('sudo', ['sudo', '-u', '#%s' % st.st_uid] + sys.argv)
              except Exception:
                  print(_('sudo failed, continuing as if nothing happened'))

          print(_('Please re-run designate-manage as root.'))
          sys.exit(2)

  
  This is an interesting decision -- if the configuration file is _not_ readable by the user in question, give the executing user complete privileges of the user that owns the unreadable file.

  I'm not a fan of hiding privilege escalation / modifications in
  programs -- if a user had recently used sudo and thus had the
  authentication token already stored for their terminal, this 'hidden'
  use of sudo may be unexpected and unwelcome, especially since it
  appears that argv from the first call leaks through to the sudo call.

  Is this intentional OpenStack style? Or unexpected for you guys too?

  (Feel free to make this public at your convenience.)

  Thanks

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